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Abstract. For four long years and reasons well known, 
Greece was absent from the international bond market. Its 
reputation as a debtor destroyed, the little Eurozone member 
country was unable to finance itself like all modern states do: 
by selling bonds to international investors. Greece had to live 
off hand-outs from foreign governments and behind the shield 
of the European Central Bank. In the spring of 2014, however, 
Greece regained access to the bond markets – surprising in 
itself, but particularly because investor demand soared and 
Greece could have placed many more bonds than it did. This 
article analyses the causes and dynamics of this odd Odyssey. 
Based on document, media, and financial data reviews and 
expert interviewing, it evaluates the comeback of Greece and 
provides a brief outlook concerning the future of the country’s 
strategic position on the financial market. The author con-
cludes that while Greece staged a successful comeback which 
was partly symbolic and theatrical, it is not yet back on track 
as a normal nation with mainstream public debt financing. 
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Introduction 
 
“If you would know the value of money, go try to borrow 
some; for he that goes a-borrowing goes a-sorrowing.” 
 
—Benjamin Franklin in Poor Richard’s Almanac (1732) 
 
It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the continu-
ously rising sovereign debt of the Member States of the Euro-
pean Union (EU) – particularly those situated at the Euro-
zone’s periphery, the “GIIPS” group of countries (Greece, It-
aly, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain). Since 2009, a key discus-
sions in the field of European economic policy concerns the 
sovereign debt crisis, as a part of the Eurozone crisis. Greece’s 
severe sovereign debt crisis has been front and center of such 
conversation. The country faced the collapse of financial in-
stitutions, high government debt and rapidly rising bond yield 
spreads in government securities (Investopedia.com, 2014).  
Although Greece is a relatively modest economy, the land 
of ancient myths and legends became a central issue for the 
Eurozone. The situation worsened after its international 
bailout in 2010 and became a tragedy. Greece was eventually 
forced to leave the bond markets due to practically non-exist-
ent demand and a change of course from expansive economics 
to strict austerity policies (Alonso, 2014, p. 1). Rapid, even 
brutal changes had enormous effects on the Eurozone, Greece 
and its citizens. Policy debates polarized not only experts but 
sparked highly emotional controversies. For four years, good 
news was scarce and prospects of hope that Greece might re-
turn to conventional public debt financing were dim.  
But then, the Greeks surprised the world. On the 14 April 
2014, Greece managed to regain access to the bond markets 
by issuing its first long-term bond since its first international 
bailout in 2010. The five-year bond, equipped with a coupon 
of 4.75 percent and a yield of 4.95 percent was issued to an 
issue volume of 3 billion euros. Bids of approximately 550 
investors returned to Athens a magnificent amount of more 
than 20 billion euros (Stamouli, 2014). The striking news of 
an eight-times oversubscribed comeback at the bond markets 
dominated the media that day. 
This article analyses this quite spectacular re-entry of 
Greece at the bond markets. In order to get a clear view over 
the issues, this article has been organized in the following 
way. The first section aims to provide a brief flashback, con-
sidering crucial factors that ultimately led to Greece’s absence 
at the bond markets since 2010. Section two begins by laying 
out the retrospective and prospective reasons for the come-
back in order to answer the question how Greece succeeded 
regaining access to the bond markets after four years of ab-
sence and why the comeback was completed in 2014. Further-
more, it will be investigated why the bond generated such a 
great demand. The third section deals with the evaluation of 
the comeback. It renders a judgment whether the emission can 
be considered as successful and whether it is sustainable and 
repeatable. The last section assesses the facts for a speculative 
outlook. It aims to answer the question what will happen after 
the comeback and whether Greece is really “back on track” to 
conventional financing after its comeback. In practical terms, 
the answer will indicate whether Greece will require the 
planned third EU bailout package. The conclusion offers a jus-
tified opinion that Greece is not yet “back on track.” 
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Flashback:  
Losing Bond Market Access 
Accession to the Eurozone in January 2001 changed the 
rules of finance for the Hellenic Republic. Implementation of 
the euro currency led to a comparatively high exchange rate, 
which harboured the danger of weakening Greece’s main ex-
ports such as agricultural and pharmaceutical products, tex-
tiles and clothing (BBC News Europe, 2013). In fact, only one 
year after the introduction of the euro, export volume shrank 
by 8.28 percent from $11.35 to $10.41 billion (de.statista.com, 
2014). The details of these development cannot be discussed 
here. It may suffice here to summarize that Greece faced a se-
rious loss of international competitiveness. 
The conventional national monetary policy option of com-
pensating the loss of competitiveness by currency value ad-
justments was now out of bounds as the European Central 
Bank steered from a supranational position. Consequently, the 
Greek government tried to counter the negative forces by an 
expansionary budgetary and economic policy. This inevitably 
led to successively increasing government expenditures 
(Focus Money Online, 2011).  
This was predominantly seen in the years before the sover-
eign debt crisis arose. Expenditures rose by 48 percent from 
84.33 billion euro in 2004 to 124.65 billion euro in 2009. 
(statista.com, 2014). Furthermore, the price level in Greece in-
creased by 3.6 percent between June 2001 and June 2002, 
whereas the prices within the benchmark, the Eurozone, in-
creased only by 1.8 percent. The result was a disproportionate 
boost of wages by 12-15 percent (Martens, 2011), which 
forced an above average consumption that was faced by in-
vestments below average. Moreover, the lack of transparency 
in government spending was accompanied by an oversized 
and inefficient apparatus of state, phantom pensioners, high 
military spending, a shadow economy of an estimated 40 per-
cent of GDP and tax revenue losses every year between 12 and 
30 billion euros (Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden 
Württemberg, 2014).  
As the country's budget deficit grew, the national debt of 
Greece continued to rise. It increased by 79 percent from 
183.16 billion euros in 2004 to 328.59 billion euros in 2010 
(de.statista.com, 2014). It was a clear breach of the Maastricht 
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, the framework of 
warnings and punitive action which was supposed to prevent 
or correct violations of budget deficit and public debt ceilings. 
Fiscal policy coordination failures added to the weak enforce-
ment provisions and a Commission tendency to “water down” 
proceedings against countries, a combination which has been 
described as the Pact’s “Achilles heel” (Schuknecht et al., 
2011, p. 9). 
The EU failed to counter the misery. Neither prevention nor 
corrective action went anywhere. Sanctions were insufficient. 
Automatic sanctions against budget offenders had been dis-
cussed in the 1990s but were not adopted as part of the treaties. 
This can be regarded as one major weak spot that led to the 
sovereign debt crisis within the EU. Accordingly, in the short 
term, it was possible for the Member States to expand their 
budget balance and debt excessively without fearing suprana-
tional sanctions. This phenomenon even occurred in Germany 
and France in 2003, when the two economically most power-
ful Member States justified the infringement by pointing out 
that they would quicky return to the thresholds. Politically it 
has to be considered that the big countries were able to prevent 
corrective sanctions by using their voting power. This was not 
possible for countries such as Greece. Punitive proceedings 
were begun in the Eurozone’s first decade but never com-
pleted for Greece (and a few other countries). In fact, an ex-
cessive deficit procedure against Greece was canceled in 2007 
against the European Central Bank’s warnings about reporting 
data reliability and policy commitments, the Commission 
over-optimistically pushed for a lenient handling (Schuknecht 
et al., 2011, p. 10).  
A short time later, Europe learned of Greece’s statistical 
misreporting and trickery, and the row of domino pieces began 
to fall. In a dramatic turn of events, Greece received its first 
bailout package in 2010. Eurozone Member States began to 
pay for the country’s debt. The Maastricht Treaty’s “no 
bailout” clause banning the assumption of liability for debt 
was hollowed (Dams & Wisdorff, 2011).  
Financial markets and financial crisis  
Being a Eurozone member gave Greece easy access to 
cheap credit. Despite its soaring sovereign debt, Greece 
throughout the 2000s received loans under almost the same 
conditions as Eurozone countries with much lower sovereign 
debt. The financial markets did not force Athens to change 
course. “Markets’ scrutiny of – and differentiation between – 
the sovereign debt of euro area countries was minimal, such 
that the worst-performing countries paid only a few basis 
points more than the best,” according to European Central 
Bank economists Schuknecht et a. (2011, p. 11). 
Rather than finding credit dry up because of unsound fiscal 
policy, the government discovered that there were no negative 
consequences. Lenders were willing to provide fresh money 
for Greek bonds, and the government took it. The implicit ex-
pectation obviously was that, contrary to the EU treaties, other 
countries would stand up for Eurozone member Greece. This 
must have seemed realistic. With the outbreak of the financial 
crisis from 2007, however, such expectations appeared more 
unlikely. Consequently, risk premiums on bonds of highly in-
debted countries such as Greece began to increase (Aldermann 
& Craig, 2011).  
The crisis led to many state measures to rescue banks. After 
Ireland, Greece was most affected by an ailing banking sector. 
In order to save banks from possible bankruptcy, Greece trans-
formed the credit risk of financial institutions into its own sov-
ereign risk. This further increased the default risk of Greece. 
It became increasingly expensive to borrow money on the fi-
nancial markets due to higher risk premiums (Häring, 2010). 
All the while regular budget deficits continued to increase 
the national debt. As the economy slumped, Athens tried to 
compensate with even more government spending. This led to 
increasingly unfavourable credit conditions. Both the increas-
ing national debt and rising interest rates weighed on the 
Greek state budget. As the performance of the Greek economy 
and the national debt were judged worse and worse by the rat-
ing agencies, the development accelerated towards ever higher 
cost of capital. 
The sovereign debt crisis 
The European sovereign debt crisis started in 2008 with the 
collapse of Iceland's banking system. In 2009, it also spread 
to Greece, Ireland and Portugal. By end of 2009, when the 
sovereign debt crisis was publicly perceived worldwide, 
Greece came into the focus of rating agencies. This could be 
seen on 8 December 2009, when the rating agency Fitch 
downgraded Greece’s credit rating for long-term debt from A- 
to BBB+ (Wearden, 2010). Trust of investors shrank immedi-
ately in the same scope as the demand for the Greek bonds. 
The bond markets were closing for the Hellenes. By late April 
2010, rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s downgraded 
Greece again, from BBB+ to BB+, the highest junk-level rat-
ing (Kell, 2010).  
As a result, Athens lost the possibility of using Keynesian 
instruments such as deficit spending to keep the economy run-
ning. Public debt rose even more disproportionately in com-
parison to the income derived, compared to earlier years 
(statista.com, 2014). This stoked the fear of an inevitable 
Greek default risk. Creditors panicked. An extremely strong 
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herd behaviour among creditors emerged. Many pushed off 
their bonds. This led to an oversupply at the markets. There 
was no corresponding demand. Bond prices fell to the bottom, 
whereas yields rose to record heights. Figure 1 displays how 
yields on ten-year government bonds developed since 1990. 
  
Figure 1. Greek ten-year government bond yield in percent  
(author’s elaboration, base data from Finanzen.net (2014)). 
 
The line graph in Figure 1 shows a tremendous upward 
trend since the international bailout of Greece in 2010. Thus, 
it was henceforward only possible to issue bonds with an ex-
ceedingly high yield level. This went hand in hand with an 
extension of the maturities of the bonds that comes close to an 
implied haircut. Since both did not represent favourable op-
tions, Greece was forced to consider alternatives. The domi-
nant alternative at that point was the Eurozone bailout, which 
required Greece to adopt a strict program of austerity 
measures. Greece was pleased to leave the bond markets.  
As Figure 2 demonstrates, the year 2012 was the high wa-
termark for bond yields for Greece and for the group of other 
sovereign debt crisis countries. The spread between GIIPS 
countries is impressive, but of the stark contrast to Germany  
is spectacular – even more so if compared to the 2000-2010 
almost flat trend line which basically rolled all Eurozone 
countries’ bonds (including those not pictured here) into one. 
Since 2012, GIIPS bond yields followed a downward trend. 
For Greece, the key event was a direct debt writedown, known 
as a “haircut,” in March 2012. Using a bond swap, Athens 
asked – or more correctly, forced – private investors to ex-
change old for new bonds with lower interest rates and longer 
maturities. Greece cut off 53.5 percent from the nominal value 
of all government debt held by private bond owners. The real 
loss was even higher at about 73 percent. It was called a “vol-
untary” exchange. Of course, no investor in his right mind 
would accept this voluntarily unless the alternative would be 
a total loss, also triggering consequences on the market for 
Credit Default Swaps. The point was to avoid a formal default. 
The negotiated deal was arranged by Eurozone leaders and the 
IMF as a precondition for the second rescue package of 130 
billion euro (DW, 2012). 
Comeback:  
Conditions for Market Re-entry  
This section seeks to answer the question how Greece even-
tually succeeded in regaining access to the bond markets after 
four years of absence. Decisive reasons and triggers for the 
comeback will be investigated. Findings will be divided into 
two sections. First, a retrospective point of view provides a 
brief analysis of Greece’s performance and particular market 
changes during the years before the comeback, which inevita-
bly led to high demand. Second, a prospective point of view 
will consider reasons and triggers for the comeback beyond an 
existing demand.  
As mentioned, successful participation in capital markets, 
notably the bond markets, implies an adequate demand for 
state securities. Thus, the critical question arises how Greece 
managed to re-create a high demand for its comeback at the 
bond markets. Furthermore, since the willingness of investors 
to purchase an underlying has a direct correlation to the attrac-
tiveness of such an asset in terms of secureness, the yield of 
return and liquidity, Greece must have managed to change 
perception and create new trust.  
A retrospective point of view 
The retrospective point of view involves the period between 
the international bailout in 2010 and the comeback in 2014. 
Remarkable for this period was the implementation of various 
austerity measures concerning taxation, public sector cuts, 
spending cuts, cutting benefits, privatisation and labour mar-
ket reforms (BBC News Business, 2011). These were compul-
sory measures demanded by the troika of international credi-
tors – the European Commission (COM), European Central 
Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – and 
a main condition associated with the bailout packages Greece 
has received during that period (BBC News Europe, 2013).  
As a result of all the efforts and financial support, Greece 
was finally rewarded. According to the Greek government, its 
financial situation in 2013 
was much better than ex-
pected. A primary surplus of 
more than 1.5 billion euros 
in the budget was generated 
(Hahn, 2014). This positive 
assessment was also stimu-
lated by several politicians. 
The Commission high-
lighted the substantial pro-
gress in fiscal consolidation 
since 2010 and confirmed 
that Greece was far above 
the target which Athens had 
agreed on with its interna-
tional creditors (The Wall 
Street Journal, 2013). 
It seemed that Greece had 
developed in the right direc-
tion. However, implement-
ing austerity policy and re-
forms during the crisis came 
at a high price for the citi-
zens of Greece who suffered 
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Figure 2. Ten-year government bond yields in percent for GIIPS Eurozone countries and Germany, 
1995-2014 as of September 2014 (Adapted from chart, Markt-Daten.de, 2014). 
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seriously. Cutting the public sector cost led to high nationwide 
unemployment, increased poverty, and reduction of public 
services, welfare benefits and health care provision. Greece 
effectively lowered the standards of living. Mass layoffs in 
both the public and private sectors culminated at an unemploy-
ment rate of 28 percent in February 2014 (BBC News Europe, 
2013).  
Citizen unrest and protests became more and more frequent. 
Public trust in the government fell to record lows. The crisis 
shook up the Greek party system and led to radicalism and 
extremely polarized elections. Despite extremely difficult do-
mestic politics, the government stuck to discipline. 
Market perception clearly changed. Rating agencies up-
graded their outlooks and thus supplemented a more upbeat 
market mood that encouraged further investments into GIIPS 
bonds (Braeu & Renault, 2014). Since 2012, large numbers of 
market participants “developed a remarkable enthusiasm for 
the European debt they once shunned” (The Economist, 
2014). The reasons may lie in the collective short-term 
memory of the markets, in line with the ECB's efforts to adapt 
the interest rate environment to the needs of the European pe-
riphery. Government bonds of peripheral countries, sur-
rounded by historically low interest rates, gained attractive-
ness due to a comparatively exalted profitability.   
The default risk of the European periphery is at least to 
some extent covered by stronger Eurozone countries. Conse-
quently, a hunger for returns and a perception of being safe 
drives investors into extensively long positions, which more-
over leads to increasing bond prices. Once the price of a bond 
increases, the yield on the respective bond declines. There-
fore, a declining yield can be considered as an indicator for a 
higher demand. Considering the development of the yields on 
ten-year GIIPS government bonds from the European periph-
ery shows further evidence for an increasing demand. 
Greece’s comeback must be understood in this larger context.  
One case is Italy, a much larger economy and key to the 
Eurozone’s fate. Italy has not been well performing in terms 
of convincing structural reforms. But the yields on ten-year 
Italian government bonds fell from 7 percent in 2012 to 3.11 
percent in 2014, which represents their lowest level since 1945 
(Braeu & Renault, 2014).  
By contrast, Portugal, Spain and Ireland have undergone 
structural reforms, which eventually started to bear fruit. Por-
tugal posted its first current account surplus for a full year at 
the end of 2013 (Braeu & Renault, 2014). In line with that, its 
bonds became more in demand than ever. This pushed the 
nominal yields down to levels not seen since Portugal joined 
the Eurozone.  
In the spring of 2013, Spain’s ten-year bonds yield came to 
4.7 percent while its inflation rate was 1.5 percent. A year later 
in 2014, as of this writing, the ten-year bonds yield amounts 
to 3.1 percent. This seems to be modest in size, but consider-
ing that inflation has fallen below zero in 2014, the improve-
ment is visible (The Economist, 2014). The catch is, of course, 
that what may look good for bond holders is effectively in-
creasing the real debt burden for the governments. 
A prospective point of view 
Analysis would be incomplete without a look at the politics 
of the bond market comeback. Regaining creditor trust is not 
simply a matter of improved fiscal and economic facts. At play 
are also symbolic, psychological and political influence fac-
tors which frame confidence in a stable climate supporting 
Greece’s future in the Eurozone. This is the rationale for a pro-
spective point of view.  
The bond market comeback, though relatively modest in 
size, aids a symbolic boost for Greece. It reinforces the hope 
that the seemingly never-ending debt crisis is nearing an end. 
This became increasingly important due to the upcoming local 
and European Parliament elections in late May 2014. There-
fore, the comeback can be considered as a trial in the face of 
political interests. This has a domestic aspect: The govern-
ment was in need to showcase its own success and legitimacy 
of its policies. The coalition wanted to shore up party support 
at the polls, defending against the upsurge of radicals such as 
the left-wing Syriza party or the far-right Golden Dawn party. 
They threatened to destabilize the government by turning the 
elections into a plebiscite on the austerity and reform policies.  
But there is also a power politics aspect with a European 
dimension. Greek political science professor Takis Pappas 
stated in an election preview: “Because of the enormity of its 
(economic and political) crisis, Greece has become both ex-
emplary and highly symbolic grounds for the big battle to be 
waged in May throughout Europe between pro-EU and anti-
EU forces” (Pappas, 2014).  
Moreover, the election can be seen as a marker for North-
South conflict in the EU. The North, led by Germany, has 
forcefully established its dominance demanding fiscal disci-
pline and a mandate for sanctions against Member States 
which do not comply with toughened Eurozone rules. The 
South is pressing for a European economics which build on 
stimulus policies, money transfers, redistribution of wealth, 
and Eurobonds. In this power struggle, Greece’s market return 
can be seen as a key political event. 
According to an editor of a well-known financial journal, 
who asked not to be named, one of the main triggers which 
were decisive for the comeback was the positioning of Ger-
many: In his interpretation, German chancellor Angela Merkel 
and finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble heavily pressured 
Greece to go forward with a new bond and offered indirect 
support. For the German government, Greece had the duty to 
show that adoption of austerity measures was working and ful-
filling reform obligations would be rewarded by the markets. 
Therefore, it was indispensable to put a sign in this direction.  
If this interpretation is correct, then the comeback was in-
ternationally staged as a political demonstration to prove that 
Germany’s Eurozone leadership was right, prudent and func-
tional all along. The political point of Greece’s bond in 2014 
was not to collect private money in order to avoid future Eu-
rozone bailouts, but to support Germany’s – and the North’s – 
claim to power over economic and monetary policy in the EU. 
Did bond market professionals and investors recognize this 
political dimension? Was it relevant to them? This is hard to 
prove, but the Greek bond issue was clearly a non-routine op-
eration. It appears logical that any investor would first look for 
reassuring signals that Athens was moving with the benign 
support of its major political stakeholders in the Eurozone.  
One may also plausibly speculate that Germany’s behind-
the-scenes support for the Greek bond helped to increase de-
mand. After all, it signalled that the bond was a safe invest-
ment. 
Another highly political interpretation is that the Greek 
bond was not just a Greek bond but a de facto Eurobond. The 
debate on the pros and cons of formal Eurobonds issued 
jointly by the Eurozone bloc has been extremely controversial. 
Greece has been for the idea; Germany against it. So far, for-
mal Eurobonds appear politically impossible. As a practical 
matter, however, the recently issued Greek bonds may have 
been interpreted by investors informally as Eurobonds since 
not only Greece is liable for a proper repayment but the entire 
Eurozone (Smeets, 2014).  
This is strongly supported by the announcement of Euro-
pean Central Bank president Mario Draghi who has stated that 
the central bank would be willing to launch a new program of 
buying government bonds if inflation continues to fall or the 
Eurozone reverses into deflation. In continuation of Draghi’s 
whatever-it-takes attitude, such a program would lead to an 
almost safe purchase guarantee with an aggregate value of up 
to one trillion euros (Smeets, 2014). 
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Reasons for high demand 
In this overall context, the financial mathematics of bond 
secureness appeared attractive. Formally speaking, investors 
who bid for the Greek bond relied on a lasting balanced beta 
coefficient of the bond. The beta coefficient in terms of the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is defined as a measure 
of the volatility, or systematic risk, of a single security or a 
portfolio in correlation to the expected market risk as a whole 
(Investopedia.com, Definition of 'Beta', 2014). Therefore, the 
assumption of a stable beta coefficient indicates the secure-
ness of an asset.  
Investors had, of course, good reason to fear the risk of an-
other Greek “haircut,” i.e. a forced debt writedown which de-
values the bonds. The memory of March 2012 lingered. Hair-
cuts have become a central issue for investors. But recent dis-
cussions have reduced the sour mood. European leaders em-
phasize that the risk of a haircut does not exist. German fi-
nance minister Wolfgang Schäuble claimed that the March 
2012 haircut was a one-time event, and further haircuts would 
not happen (Smeets, 2014).  
The claim is strongly supported by the fact that the 2014 
Greek bond was issued based on British law. This has a his-
torical significance since the 2012 haircut mainly affected 
those bonds issued under the Greek law. The new legal basis 
became a major condition associated with the comeback. Pos-
sible litigation would be held in British courts, which may 
consider the interests of creditors more than Greek courts 
would (Smeets, 2014). A possible haircut can further only by 
decided by a majority of creditors. The bond issue based on 
British law can be recognized as a safeguard or insurance for 
investors. This has made the bond more attractive, but not nec-
essarily absolutely safe. If Greece went bankrupt tomorrow, 
even British law would not help. Nevertheless, it is a hedge 
that is intended to give investors courage to buy. 
Additionally, a possible implied haircut in the form of fur-
ther reduced interest rates and extended maturities of Greek 
bonds would primarily affect public, not private, creditors 
(Smeets, 2014).   
Last but not least it has to be stated that the “remarkable 
enthusiasm” for the European periphery  (The Economist, 
2014) was one of the main reasons for the high demand. 
Comeback Evaluation 
A successful comeback? 
Considering Greece’s fundraising alternatives, the come-
back looks somewhat questionable. The Greek government 
placed a bond which appears more expensive for the public 
treasury than going for credit aid from European institutions. 
Since the establishment of the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF), the European Financial Stability Mechanism 
(EFSM) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 
Greece is able to incur debt for interest rates up to 2.125 per-
cent (Finanzen.net, Anleihen Info: Europaeischer 
Stabilitaetsmechanismus ESM Anleihen, 2014). That is why 
the comeback at the bond markets by issuing a bond equipped 
with a coupon of 4.75 percent can be regarded as rather dubi-
ous from the perspective of the Greeks, especially after a re-
quired straight austerity marathon.  
Nevertheless, the evaluation of the comeback requires the 
contemplation of both, today’s alternatives and the history, 
considered as two substantial benchmarks. The 4.75 percent 
coupon cannot be interpreted unambiguously. On the one 
hand, the bond’s 4.75 percent coupon value is high compared 
to the ESM coupons of 2.125 percent.  
On the other hand, the European funding option may not be 
the right measuring stick. As the editor of a financial journal 
interviewed for this article emphasized, the bond coupon can 
be regarded as comparatively low if Greece’s bond history is 
a measure: In February 2012, markets demanded 30 percent 
for Greek bonds.  
A second indicator of success can be seen in the broad de-
mand for the Hellas bond. The bond was issued to a volume 
of 3 billion euros, but the bids of approximately 550 investors 
brought a magnificent amount of more than 20 billion euros 
(Stamouli, 2014).  
In sum, the comeback can be considered successful due to 
a comparatively low coupon and broad demand. It was a mar-
ket vote of confidence – exactly what Athens wanted (and per-
haps what the German doctor ordered). 
A repeatable comeback? 
The demand for Greek bonds was impressive. But was it a 
one-hit wonder? The question whether future emissions will 
happen is gaining increasingly in importance. Current market 
perception seems to favor the European periphery. This could 
make further emissions possible. However, markets do what 
they want and can swiftly change their directions and trends. 
Nevertheless, there are stable factors that can ensure Greece’s 
remaining at the capital markets. These can be distilled from 
the previous analysis: 
 
 Market participants proceed with a collective short-term 
memory.  
 Investors face a persistent low interest rate environment, 
facilitated by the European Central Bank. 
 Greece continuous to implement reforms successfully. 
 Bonds offer a predictable lasting balanced beta coeffi-
cient.  
 The Eurozone continues to commit as a creditor and 
compensator of Greece’s default risk. 
 Investors remain hungry for returns despite the risk. 
 Yields stay low or decline further.  
 Rating agencies further upgrade their outlooks or at least 
do not downgrade Greece. 
 The European Central Banks steers a course which in-
cludes the option of government bond purchases. 
 New haircuts are improbable. 
 New bond issues are anchored in British law. 
Obviously there are more factors than mentioned here, but 
the author stipulates that as long as these factors are retained, 
future successful emissions appear quite possible and likely. 
Thus, the comeback can be considered as repeatable. This con-
clusion can be supported by a recent Bloomberg report quot-
ing a Greek government official: “To avoid another bailout, 
Greece aims to jump-start its newly regained financial-market 
access. The government plans to sell up to 3 billion euros in 
three-year bonds” (Chrysoloras & Christie, 2014). It has to be 
considered that a maturity of three years harbours more risks 
than the previous 2014 five-year bond. Investors will start to 
ask themselves whether Greece is able to repay its debt in only 
three years’ time.  
A sustainable comeback? 
This section looks for evidence for the sustainability of the 
comeback. The question whether the new bond can be seen as 
a safe or a gambler's investment has to be answered. In line 
with that, the development of the yield directly after the pur-
chasing at the primary market and the types of investors who 
bid for the bond have to be examined.  
The initial yield of 4.95 percent climbed quickly to over 
5.13 percent within 48 hours after the emission (Zschäpitz, 
2014). That shed light on what really happened. The investors 
bought the bond at the primary market and directly sold it on 
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the secondary market. Indeed, that is not the behaviour of mar-
ket participants such, for example, as American investor leg-
end Warren Buffet who trust their assets. The bond value ap-
pears overrated. Furthermore, it looks highly speculative and 
therefore rather suited to the yield schematic of venturesome 
investors such as hedge funds. In fact, hedge funds made for 
about 33 percent of the investors which bid for the bond, as 
displayed in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Allocation of investors who bid for the 2014 Greek 
bond (author’s elaboration, data from Zschäpitz (2014)). 
 
The make-up of the investor community is unusual for a 
bond issue. It seems that Greece attracted a special kind of in-
vestors. Only four percent of the issue went to insurance com-
panies or pension funds, which normally represent the largest 
group of investors in government bonds. Banks bought 14 per-
cent of the bonds whereas 49 percent went to other fund com-
panies, whose affiliation is not entirely possible. They might 
include a large share of speculators (Zschäpitz, 2014). 
Although Greece proved that it can find funding through its 
own resources and devices, the allocation of investors sheds 
light on problematic circumstances in terms of sustainability. 
Sustainable presence on the bond market would suggest that a 
country finds reliable, risk-averse long-term financiers. A pre-
ponderance of speculators throws a big shadow over the small 
proportion of institutional and typically risk-averse investors. 
One may conclude that the bond can be conveniently consid-
ered a gambler's investment. This definitely does not represent 
an indicator for security.  
A critical appreciation of who buys Greek debt for what 
purpose leads to the conclusion that the country’s market op-
portunities seem volatile and are in the hands of firms which 
are known to make money on volatility. This is not good news. 
It is not only the bond itself which carries risk, but the poten-
tial behavior of the bondholders. Given that Greece is other-
wise still highly dependent on EU backup, particularly Euro-
zone countries as its main creditors, the market comeback 
overall cannot be considered as a sustainable re-entry.  
Outlook: Back on Track? 
This last section aims to answer the question whether 
Greece is really back on track after its comeback or not. It ex-
amines whether Greece will require the planned third bailout 
package from the EU or not. The section concludes with a 
brief interpretation of European Parliament election results in 
Greece for political context. 
The bond issue did not change the overall situation. For the 
foreseeable future, Greece will have to be funded by its richer 
European neighbors. Austerity by itself does nothing to stim-
ulate the economy and provide much-needed revenue income. 
Recovery and complex “adjustment programmes” under EU-
IMF surveillance notwithstanding, the key macroeconomic in-
dicator of total gross public debt is a depressive sight. As of 
this writing, Greece’s national debt totals about 177 percent of 
GDP (see Table 1). Maastricht rules set a limit of 60 percent. 
Even though many European nations honor this rule by the 
breach, Greece’s distance from the target is far too great by 
any comparison, as an editor for a leading financial journal 
interviewed for this article stressed: It is simply inconceivable 
that Greece can meet the target by piecemeal financial and fis-
cal operations. The country, he opines, still needs large-scale 
debt forgiveness. Quittance can come about only by a haircut 
or debt conversion to a degree which implies that investors 
would not get back anything but lose everything. Any new 
bonds carry this risk. 
 
Forecasts  2012 2013 2014 2015 
GDP growth 
(%, yoy) 
-7,0 -3,9 0,6 2,9 
Inflation  
(%, yoy) 
1,0 -0,9 -0,8 0,3 
Unemployment (%) 24,3 27,3 26,0 24,0 
Public budget  
balance  
(% of GDP) 
-8,9 -12,7 -1,6 -1,0 
Gross  
public debt  
(% of GDP) 
157,2 175,1 177,2 172,4 
Current account  
balance  
(% of GDP) 
-4,6 -2,4 -2,3 -2,2 
 
Table 1. May 2014 economic forecast for Greece by the 
European Commission’s Directorate-General  Economic 
and Financial Affairs (European Commission, 2014). 
 
The comeback was strong in terms of demand. But does that 
mean the third bailout package is off the table? No. Three bil-
lion euros are like a drop in the ocean. A successful placement 
of the bond is only a small step away from extensive financial 
support of international creditors. While EU financial support 
expires at the end of the year, Greece will still be supported 
by the IMF in smaller yet substantial capacities.  
Politically, the government’s position has not improved. 
Market success did not translate into any political gain; at best, 
it helped to solidify fleeting support. Final results from the Eu-
ropean Parliament elections 2014 in Greece are illustrated in 
Figure 3. Government policies have led to a serious political 
fallout in the polling booths. The anti-austerity radical leftist 
Syriza coalition won the elections with 26.6 percent of the 
vote (BBC News Europe, 2013). At the other end of the spec-
trum, the right-wing extremist Golden Dawn also benefitted 
from a rising EU-sceptic mood and received 9.4 percent.  
 
 
Figure 4. Greek European Parliament election results 
(Metapolls.net, 2014). 
 
Government coalition parties – the conservative New De-
mocracy (ND) and the Socialist PASOK, core of the Olive 
Tree alliance – barely held on to a plurality together. A few 
years ago, Greece had essentially a two-party system where 
only ND and PASOK competed. In the European Parliament 
elections of May 2014, their vote share shrank to less than 
one-third. While the election cannot be interpreted as a total 
destruction of the government’s legitimacy, it certainly is a 
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political shock. The EP elections had a direct correlation to the 
local elections in Greece, which produced similar results. The 
government coalition’s local support base is eroding. Greece’s 
political system is in the middle of a far-reaching realignment 
and dealignment of voters. What this will mean for the next 
several years is up to speculation. 
Greece is currently a country where left-wing radicals rep-
resent the strongest and right-wing extremists the third strong-
est political force. The political future of Greece is likely to be 
one of polarized confrontations and great obstacles to effec-
tive governance. The outlook is not good for calm, consensus-
driven policy-making or a generally stable government. Inves-
tors will understand that the political risk of this country is 
substantial. 
Taken together, these facts and prospects mandate the find-
ing that Greece is not yet “back on track.” 
Conclusion 
This paper has given an account of and the reasons for 
Greece’s re-entry at the bond markets after four years of ab-
sence. Primarily, research findings have shown that Greece 
lost its access to the bond markets in 2010 due to several mu-
tually reinforcing causes. Those especially concern the acces-
sion to the Eurozone that finally led to significant economic 
consequences. Greece failed continually to meet Maastricht 
criteria, while the EU’s insufficient sanctions failed to coun-
teract the misery. It seems that Greece's large sovereign debt 
was totally ignored by the financial markets. Greece received 
for a long time loans at almost the same conditions as EU 
countries with much lower sovereign debt. The debt piled up.  
The outbreak of the financial crisis from 2007 had a great 
impact on the country. Greece was highly affected by an ailing 
banking sector. In order to save its financial institutions, the 
sovereign took over bank risks. In 2009, when the European 
sovereign debt crisis began, rating agencies downgraded the 
Greek debt considerably. After that, the trust of investors 
shrank immediately, as did the demand for Greek bonds. 
Many bondholders sold off their Greek securities, effecting a 
market oversupply. From then on, it was only possible to issue 
bonds with high yield levels. Greek bonds held junk status. 
Greece was forced into the 2010 Eurozone bailout, followed 
by the adoption of austerity measures and avoidance of further 
unsound fiscal policy. 
The article then answered the questions how Greece suc-
ceeded regaining access to the bond markets after four years 
of absence, and what the decisive reasons for the comeback 
were. The retroperspective analysis showed that Greece 
worked toward economic stability and generated a primary 
surplus. This re-created investor confidence. One of the more 
significant findings to emerge from this study is that market 
perceptions changed in recent years. Greece benefited from an 
improved view of European periphery country bonds.  
The 2014 Greek bond issue also was helped by a view that 
it was not only the Greek government which guaranteed re-
payment but the entire Eurozone. Evidence from a prospective 
analysis suggests that this comeback, though relatively modest 
in size, aids a symbolic boost for Greece. It can be considered 
a trial in the face of political interests, triggered particularly 
by Germany. Greece’s return to the market was a political 
event, a demonstration that austerity works.  
The third section evaluated the comeback and to figure out 
whether the re-entry can be considered as successful, repeata-
ble and sustainable. Results indicate that the comeback can be 
deemed successful due to a comparatively low coupon and 
great demand. The bond issue is also likely to be repeatable. 
But it is less certain that the comeback is sustainable. The 
2014 bond attracted few institutional and risk-averse investors 
but a high share of investors with speculative behaviour. 
The results from the last section are the following. Greece 
may have taken steps in the right direction but is not back on 
the right track yet. The reasons are mainly macroeconomic. 
Despite the recovery, a third bailout for Greece might still be 
in the cards. In addition, Greece’s future is burdened by sub-
stantial risk and volatility in the country’s political system. 
In the art of public borrowing, Greece’s return to the bond 
markets after four years of absence was an impressive piece 
of work. A fiscal and economic masterpiece it was not. It stays 
as a successful interim measure with a good deal of political 
value. But Greece has yet to prove it can sustain its momentum 
on the capital market.  
Not only has the country a great need to cut its debt to a 
level which it can realistically pay back; it also has to find bet-
ter creditors that are willing to invest in Greece without dom-
inant motives of speculation. Until then, Greece will not seri-
ously be “back on track” as a normal member of the Eurozone.  
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